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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PARADOXIS or LEGAL SCIFSCE. By Benjamin N. Cardozo.

Columbia University Press. 1926.

New York:

Pp. 136.

Here is a companion volume for the two preceding books written by
Judge Cardozo within the past half-dozen years, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw
and THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. It is in much the same tone and,
like the others, consists of a series of lectures, this time on the Carpentier
foundation, Columbia University. The book develops further the point of view
which this eminent jurist has emphasized before. Like its predecessors, it is
in some respects a penetrating intellectual autobiography, describing, in places
approaching the tragic, the mental and spiritual travail of an extremely sensitive intellect. Many will regard this as the best of the series.
paradox with which the author is concerned is the eternal one,
The first
"rest and motion." He suspects that the motion of the law is not the smooth
and gradual process that it has been thought to be, but rather a progression
of leaps and jumps. The law is now static, now in sudden motion. Surveyed
over a period of years through the eyes of the historical jurist, it gives the
illusion of continuous motion. In any event, there must necessarily be both
rest and motion. There can be, it is discerned, no change without conservation. Otherwise there is mere passage from nothing to nothing. In regulating conduct, the problem for law is one of continued adjustment, the adjustment of rules of conduct to the phantasmagora of human experience. "When
changes of manners or business," for example, "have brought it about that a
rule of law which corresponded to previously existing norms or standards of
behavior, corresponds no longer to the present norms or standards, but on the
contrary departs from them, then those same forces or tendencies of development that brought the law into adaptation to the old norms and standards
And so it is that the forces
are effective . . . to restore the equilibrium."
of life, expressing themselves in society, will determine law. On the one
hand will be the inertia of custom; on the other the teleological faith of one
shaping material to effectuate desired ends. Between the two extremes will
be found every gradation of criteria for judgment, all determined by the
social pressure behind. The author's 6xperienee on one of the highest courts
in the world is not wanting in rich illustration.
In the chapter on "Social Justice-The Science of Values"-which some
will have it is the best in the book-Judge Cardozo relies heavily upon the
pragmatist view. We are to be wary of ambitious conceptions of justice
and absolute notions of right. "It comes down to this," he assures us, "There
are certain forms of conduct which at any given place and epoch are commonly
accepted under the combined influence of reason, practice and tradition, as
moral or immoral. . . . Law accepts as the pattern of its justice the morality
Thus it is that
of the community whose conduct it assumes to regulate."
justice is fundamentally an ethical conception, although, like ethics, it will
sometimes divulge a content frequently regarded as something to contrast
So
with justice, e. g., "grace," "compassion," perhaps, at times, "pity."
when beneficence and generosity acquire such social pressure that the sanction
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will become determinate, it becomes incorporated into law, i. e., it becomes a
part of the jural norm of justice.
The law, it is pointed out, does not create a scale of values. It adopts
that found in the "social mind." But.this social mind is a scientific conception, and is to be regarded as producing critically thought out social judgments
which are not to be confused with mere passing popular opinion or, perhaps
still more important, with the frenzied desire of the mob. Law accordingly
does not slow up civilization nor does it accelerate it. It but regulates it
lest it defeat itself.
But Judge Cardozo distrusts soinewhat the science of axiology. We may
well fear that in moments of trial he will abandon it in desperation and look
to some magic power to direct him to the "lucky find" necessary to a happy
solution of the problem. Are we, then, to identify the vague promptings of
intuition or instinct or whatnot with those "luminous hypotheses" which, as
everyone knows, are the7 landmarks of scientific progress? Surely it cannot
be. These "luminous hypotheses" are the direct products of the creative
imagination, indeed, but they are born of an imagination thoroughly grounded
and rooted in the facts of empirical knowledge. In the last analysis, then,
it must be this"empirical knowledge that is to furnish our only divining wand
for truth.
In the constant bialancing of interests, it must be remembered that in some
phases of the law fixity and certainty must be evaluated higher than in
others. The law of Bills and Notes, of Real Property and of Conflict of Laws
are suggested as examples. Numerous citations to New York decisions again
furnish repeated illustrations demonstrating how back of the determination of
the legality or non-legality of acts and situations the value of these acts or
situations for society is constantly pressing for recognition. Thus again
every judgment is more properly to be regarded as an adjustment.
Nor is any question entirely free from doubt as these interests are continually being re-evaluated. Even basic questions--those regarded as fundamental in our law-are often shrowded in uncertainty, e. g., the privilege
to employ force when threatened with assault by one with a deadly weapon;
the privilege to employ force to recapture a chattel; to effect an entry to land.
But by a return to pragmatism, there is peace to be found. Now we shall only
aspire to an adaptation to experience, content with a temporary adjustment.
In one of the most chaotic field of the law, that of legal or "proximate"
cause, the author will find the orthodox "tests" as no more than guides or
clews to assist and direct the judgment. After all, "there is something in the
minds of men . . . which solves
this problem of causation."
"The
truth which the law seeks in tracing events to causes is truth pragmatically
envisaged, truth relative to jural ends."
But in the final lecture Judge Cardozo falters again. Liberty this time
is the paradox. He recognizes the conception of liberty, not as a datum, but
as a standard developed by the social sciences. This conception, however, he
will bend somewhat or modify to fit constitutional dogmas of "property" and
perhaps even of "liberty."
Is this another intrusion of the "higher law"?
Are we to offer up a living conception of liberty which social science is constructing out of the very experience of human beings, a sacrifice to a static and
uncompromising dogmat Judge Cardozo himself has seldom done so, although
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his brothers have frequently so 'sinned. Are we to mistake the means for the
end, and thus misuse the pragmatist test, as William James himself has done?
Are we to confuse, after all, those "critically thought out" social judgments
as to balancing of interests with prejudiced and biggotted dogmas as to
means or instruments, which are eternally obstructing the progress of science
and the scientific solution of human problems? If this is what we are to understand by the higher law, it is permissible to submit that there is more than
a mere resemblance in name between it and that "higher law" which for
centuries obstructed the very adjustments which Judge Cardozo so confidently
FowLER VINCENT HARPER,
and justly commends.
University of Oregon.
THE BUSIxESS OF THE SUPREME COURT. By Felix Frankfurter and James M.
Landis. New York: The MacMillan Co. 1928. Pp. viii, 318.
This book is avowedly an attempt to reveal the story of political and
economic strife which lies hidden beneath the technicalities which govern the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. It first appeared in the Harvard Law
Review in serial form. The method is historical and the plan chronological.
The scholarship is of the highest order and the text is illuminated with extensive notes. Infinite pains have been expended in going to original documentary
sources, with a corresponding presumption of accuracy.
We are introduced first to the considerations underlying the First Judiciary Act. Elaboration is made upon the parts played by state jealousy and
the fiscal necessities of the Union to enforce its own claims. It is pointed out
how the act was, in fact, a compromise between conflicting economic and
political interests. Incidentally, innumerable incidents of the history of the
judiciary, of independent interest for lawyers, are woven into the general
story--incidents interesting in themselves, but unknown to the average lawyer.
For example, who knows how many judges there were under the First Judiciary
Act I When did Congress first start its tiresome and endless series of "I investigations"? What were the arguments for and against the system of circuit
riding? Why has reform of the federal judiciary occurred only after the need
therefor has become unbearable ? Who and what were the "Imidnight judges"?
Has the supreme court ever consisted of more than nine members? How many
miles would a justice travel in a year doing circuit court work? And so on.
From the Civil War to the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, more and more
is it shown how ''the history of the federal courts is woven into the history
of the times." The economics of the period immediately following the war
were reflected in the litigation of the supreme court. It forceably appears
that the history of the federal courts is a living part of our national life.
Great commercial activity and development, panics, land booms, railroad building, cannot but produce vast litigation. Again, the political and economic
implications of the Fourteenth Amendment gave complexion to supreme court
business. The movement toward nationalization was significant. We were now
a nation, with a nation's litigation. Not the least significant phase of this
period of supreme court history was the impossibility of relief for the congestion of judicial business by reason of the inability of Congress and the executive to cooperate regarding relief measures, due, of course, to the burning

